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"That's the real problem with kids who struggle with learning ... Some kids feel
like they're stupid. I want them to know that they're not. They just learn differently.
Once they understand that and have the tools to learn in their individual way, then
they can feel good about themselves."' This quote from Charles Schwab, the
financial pioneer who discovered that he had dyslexia at the age of 40, embodies the
importance of having federal statutes, such as the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act 2 and Section 504 the Rehabilitation Act,3 that guarantee special
education programs and reasonable accommodations to eligible students with
learning disabilities. However, learning disabilities are not exclusive to the formal
education process. In fact, learning disabilities often remain with individuals long
after their experiences as students. Unfortunately, until the enactment of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"),4 individuals with learning
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1 Charles Schwab, GoodLearners.net, Sept. 12, 2011, http://www.good
learners.net/behaviordisorders.htmi.
2 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
4 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
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disabilities often faced a roadblock when seeking to make the transition from student
to professional. The roadblock came in the form of a state licensing exam.
The ADA was the first piece of federal legislation to guarantee accommodations
on state licensing exams for individuals with learning disabilities.5 The ADA had
the purpose of assuring "equality of opportunity" and the "elimination of
discrimination" in regard to all individuals with disabilities.6 However, over the
course of two decades, the courts steadily narrowed the ADA's scope of protection.
Individuals with learning disabilities who sought accommodations on licensing
exams experienced the negative effects of such judicial interpretations. As a result,
Congress took action to restore a "broad scope of protection" under the ADA by
enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA").'
This Article argues that the courts must be cognizant of Congress' intention to
broaden the scope of the ADA, especially in regard to reading impaired individuals
who request reasonable accommodations on licensing exams. Part I examines the
ADA's protections for individuals with learning disabilities. Part II discusses the
applicability of the ADA to licensing exams, including state bar exams. Part III
examines case law over the past twenty years pertaining to learning impaired
individuals who have requested accommodations on licensing exams. Part IV
analyzes the ADAAA and focuses on its potential to change the status quo for
learning impaired individuals who request accommodations on licensing exams.
Finally, Part V puts forth recommendations for the courts to provide appropriate
standards for individuals requesting accommodations on licensing exams under the
amended ADA. Specifically, this Article suggests that: (1) courts should no longer
foreclose the finding of a substantially limiting impairment in regard to the major life
activity of reading due to an individual's academic success; (2) "working" should be
recognized as an appropriate major life activity under which to evaluate claims for
accommodations on the bar exam (and possibly other licensing exams), with such
evaluations involving a comparison to most people having comparable training,
skills, and abilities; and (3) reading disabilities should be recognized not only by
psychometric tests that show a substantial limitation in comparison to most people,
but also by test scores that indicate a significant discrepancy between an individual's
intellectual capacity and actual reading ability. By following these
recommendations, the courts will be able to evaluate future claims for
accommodations on licensing exams with standards that reflect Congress' intention
to provide a broad scope of protection under the ADA.
I. PROTECTION FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES UNDER THE ADA
Traditionally, proving the existence of a disability is the primary obstacle that an
individual must overcome in order to qualify for protections under the ADA. The
ADA defines disability to mean "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
See 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(a) (2011).
6 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(8), 12101(b) (2006).
See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, (Sutton 1l) 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
8 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(b)(1) (2008).
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limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual."9 The language
does not clearly indicate whether individuals with learning disabilities are entitled to
protections under the ADA. Fortunately, the ADA's implementing regulations
clarify that learning disabilities fall under the ADA's umbrella of protection. The
Department of Justice ("DOJ") regulations explicitly define the phrase "physical or
mental impairment" to include "specific learning disabilities."' 0 The regulations also
define "major life activities" to include "learning.""
The term "learning disability" has failed to acquire a commonly accepted
meaning, and the ADA does not explicitly attempt to define it.12 In general, leamring
disabilities include a wide range of cognitive disorders, the most common of which
is dyslexia, a reading impairment.' 3 The ambiguity surrounding learning disabilities
makes it difficult for experts to diagnose them. Experts often employ psychometric
tests in order to diagnose specific learning disabilities. For example, a psychometric
test intended to identify dyslexia would measure an individual's reading ability.14 In
practice, some experts use a combination of psychometric tests and clinical
observations to diagnose these disabilities.' 5 Still, others rely on psychometric tests
alone.' 6  Specific learning disabilities can also be diagnosed by proving a
discrepancy between an individual's inherent capacity and actual performance.
However, courts have not always accepted such a discrepancy as indicative of a
disability, especially in cases of individuals requesting accommodations on
professional licensing exams.' 7  Individuals requesting accommodations on
9 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006) ("The term disability means,
with respect to an individual ... (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment").
'o 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2011); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011).
1 Id.
12 Samuel S. Heywood, Without Lowering the Bar: Eligibility for Reasonable
Accommodations on the Bar Exam for Learning Disabled Individuals Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 33 GA. L. REV. 603, 609 (1999) (referencing Patricia Dunn, LEARNING
RE-ABLED: THE LEARNING DISABILITY CONTROVERSY AND COMPOSITION STUDIES, 15-20
(Peter R. Stillman et. al. 1995)).
'3 Id. at 609 (referencing Frank A. Vellutino, Documenting the Existence of Dyslexia:
Rationale for the Criteria Recommended to the New York State Board of Law Examiners for
Documenting the Existence of a Learning Disability ("Dyslexia") as the Basis for Special
Accommodations on the New York State Bar Exam, 63 B. ExAM'R 6, 6-7 (1994)).
14 Vellutino, supra note 13, at 9.
1s Heywood, supra note 12, at 610-11 (citing Pazer v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 849
F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (ruling that the plaintiff did not have a learning disability based
on psychometric test score along with other observations)).
16 Id. at 611 (citing Argen v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 860 F. Supp. 84, 91
(W.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding exclusive reliance on psychometric test scores preferable to a
qualitative evaluation)).
'7 See, e.g., Price v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 F. Supp. 419, 426-27 (S.D. W.Va.
1997) (holding that any reference to a disparity between capacity for achievement and actual
achievement was inadmissible because it would undermine the "comparison to most people"
2011]1 293
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professional licensing exams often have a history of academic success, which has
caused courts to question whether such individuals could possibly have an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.'8
When the ADA was signed into law on July 26, 1990, President George H.W.
Bush declared that "every man, woman, and child with a disability can now pass
though once closed doors into a bright, new era of equality, independence, and
freedom."l 9 However, due to narrow judicial interpretations of the ADA, many have
questioned whether such "closed doors" have actually been opened. The narrowed
scope of protection under the ADA contributed to the 11 0Ih Congress' desire to enact
the ADAAA, and "carry out the ADA's objectives . . . by reinstating a broad scope
of protection to be available under the ADA."20 Although the text of ADAAA does
not explicitly address learning disabilities, the House Committee on Education and
Labor specifically expressed its rejection of case law that unjustly limited access to
reasonable accommodations for individuals with learning disabilities.21
II. THE ADA's APPLICABILITY TO LICENSING EXAMS
The ADA was the first piece of federal civil rights legislation to pertain to state
licensing exams.22 Prior to the ADA, there were no federal grounds to challenge the
fairness of bar exams or medical licensing tests.23 Although the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 mandated that institutions receiving federal funding not discriminate against
handicapped individuals, it was not guaranteed that state bar examiners would be
covered under this Act due to their lack of federal assistance.24 It has been argued
25that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to state licensing exams.
26However, this argument has generally faced rejection. The apparent reason for
approach as set forth in the Department of Justice regulations implementing Titles II and III of
the ADA).
18 See, e.g., id.; Gonzales v. Nat. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 225 F.3d 620, 630 (6th Cir. 2000);
Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004).
19 George H.W. Bush, U.S. President, Signing Ceremony for the Americans with
Disabilities Act (July 26, 1990), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/
videos/ada signingtext.html.
20 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(b)(1) (2008).
21 H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 10 (2008) (rejecting the findings in Price, 966 F. Supp.
419; Gonzales, 225 F.3d 620; Wong, 410 F.3d 1097).
22 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(a) (2011).
23 W. Sherman Rogers, The ADA, Title VII, and the Bar Examination: The Nature and
Extent of the ADA's Coverage of Bar Examinations and an Analysis of the Applicability of
Title VII to Such Tests, 36 How. L. J. 1, 2 (1993).
24 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2006). But see Bartlett v. N.Y. State
Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329-30 (2d Cir. 1998) (Bartlett III) (finding the Board to
be bound by the Rehabilitation Act, even though the Board did not receive direct federal
funding, because two state entities received federal funding and extended assistance to the
Board),judgment vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
25 See generally Rogers, supra note 23, at 2-15.
26 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
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such rejection is the fear that Title VII would perpetually require the invalidation of
many state licensing exams, including all bar exams.27 In contrast to Title VII, the
application of the ADA to state licensing exams has not required the invalidation of
such exams. The ADA's implementing regulations imply that the sole remedy
available to disabled test takers is a modification in the way that the exam is
administered.28
The ADA provides comprehensive protection to individuals with disabilities in
several areas, and contains titles pertaining to employment ("Title I"), public services
("Title II"), public accommodations and services operated by private entities ("Title
III"), telecommunications ("Title IV"), and miscellaneous matters ("Title V").29 Title H
and Title III are particularly relevant to licensing exam situations. Title II defines a
public entity as being "any State or local government" or "any department, agency ...
or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." 30 Since licensing
examination boards serve as instrumentalities of state governments, these boards are
considered public entities within the scope of Title 1I. 3 1
However, Title II, unlike Title III, contains no specific standard for determining
whether the selection or administration of a licensing exam is performed in a
nondiscriminatory manner.32 The DOJ, which was given the explicit task of
implementing regulations pertaining to Titles II and III,33 addressed this matter in
1992 by issuing an amicus curiae memorandum in the case of Rosenthal v. New
York State Board of Law Examiners explaining that although the regulation
implementing Section 309 of Title III applied to "private entities,"3 4 the detailed
testing standards set forth in the regulations "are useful as a guide for determining
what constitutes discriminatory conduct by a public entity in testing situations under
both Titles II and III.""3 This view, however, does not undermine the significance of
27 Id. (alluding to the concern that any application of Title VII would invalidate many state
licensing statutes).
28 See Rogers, supra note 23, at 2.
29 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
30 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1213 1(1)(A)-(B) (2006).
31 See Rogers, supra note 23, at 8 (referencing NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'RS, BAR
ExAM'Rs HANDBOOK 95-97 (1980)).
32 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12189 (2006) ("Any person that offers
examinations or courses related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for
secondary or post-secondary education, professional, or trade purposes shall offer such
examinations or courses in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or offer
alternative accessible arrangements for such individuals.").
3 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (2006) ("Not later than 1 year
after July 26, 1990, the Attorney General shall promulgate regulations in an accessible format
that implement this part.").
34 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(a) (2011).
3 See Michael K. McKinney, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on the
Bar Examination Process: The Applicability of Title II and Title III to the Learning Disabled,
26 CUMB. L. REv. 669, 677 (1995-1996) (quoting Amicus Curiae Mem. of the United States,
Rosenthal v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. 92 Civ. 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (unreported
decision)).
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Title II to other aspects of the state licensing process. Title 1I still applies to certain
aspects of the licensing process such as the investigation of the applicant's character
and fitness. Title II, for example, would be the only appropriate basis for
challenging such an aspect of the licensing process since Title III is limited to the
selection and administration of licensing exams.36
III. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Early Years (1991-1999)
A significant portion of the case law pertaining to requests for accommodations
on licensing exams has involved questions of how to interpret the ADA's ambiguous
terms. Although many individuals suffer from what is commonly known as a
"learning disability," the ADA's scope of protection for an individual with a
"learning disability" is restricted to those whose situation is covered by the Act's
definition of disability, which requires an impairment to "substantially limit[] one or
more ... major life activities.' 7 The DOJ elaborated upon this definition by
declaring that "[a] person is considered an individual with a disability ... when the
individual's important life activities are restricted as to the conditions, manner, or
duration under which they can be performed in comparison to most people."3 This
standard was the controversial subject of a few important cases in the ADA's early
history.
Pazer v. New York State Board of Law Examiners was one of the earliest ADA
cases involving a request for licensing exam accommodations due to a learning
disability.39  In Pazer, a bar examination applicant was twice denied
accommodations by the New York State Board of Law Examiners for his alleged
visual processing disability. After instituting an administrative appeal that was
eventually denied, Pazer commenced a court action pursuant to Titles II and III of
the ADA to compel the board to provide him with reasonable accommodations to
take the bar exam over a period of four days rather than two, and use of a
computer.40 The court issued an opinion that focused primarily on whether Pazer
was "substantially limited" in a major life activity.
The court specifically noted the importance of the DOJ regulations pertaining to
Title III's language on examinations. Section 36.309 of the DOJ regulations requires
examinations to be administered so that the results "accurately reflect the
individual's aptitude or achievement level . . . rather than reflecting the individual's
impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills."4A In noting the importance of this
regulation, the court found some merit to the argument that a discrepancy between
inherent capacity and performance permits the inference of a substantially limiting
impairment, even if the individual's actual performance has met the standard of the
36 See Rogers, supra note 23, at 7.
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006).
38 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 App. B. (2011) (defining a substantial limitation of a major life
activity).
39 Pazer v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 849 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
40 Id. at 285-86.
41 Id. at 286 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.309 (1992)).
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ordinary person.42 In other words, the court implied that it might grant
accommodations to an applicant who was found to possess above-average
intellectual capabilities but had nonetheless performed in the average range on
psychometric tests or in school.43
However, the Pazer court was ultimately not persuaded that such a discrepancy
could compel the finding of a disability as a matter of law. In fact, Pazer's timed
reading comprehension score, which put him in the 6 4 th percentile, provided enough
evidence for the court to declare that Pazer was not substantially limited in the major
life activity of reading, despite the fact that he scored in the 8 4 ,h percentile on a
similar reading comprehension test that was conducted without time limits."
Price v. National Board of Medical Examiners also involved individuals
requesting accommodations on a licensing exam.45 In Price, the plaintiffs, medical
students who had completed the equivalent of two years of study, requested
additional time and private rooms when taking Step 1 of the United States Medical
Licensing Examination because of their Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder,
Reading Disorder, and Disorder of Written Expression.46 After being denied such
accommodations by the board, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the Southern
District of West Virginia.
The court found that none of the plaintiffs had exhibited a history of substantial
academic difficulties. 7 In response, the plaintiffs cited Pazer to support their
position that average performance does not necessarily preclude an individual from
48
qualifying as a person with a disability under the ADA. However, the Price court
rejected the reasoning of Pazer. The court further held that Section 36.309 of the
DOJ regulations, which requires examinations to reflect the applicant's aptitude
rather than the applicant's impairment, did not outweigh the principle that an
impairment must limit a person in comparison to "most people" in order to be
considered a disability worthy of accommodations. 49 The court went on to cite the
plaintiffs' history of significant scholastic achievement as reflecting a complete
absence of any impairment that could be said to limit the plaintiffs in comparison to
"most people.',50
B. The Sutton Impact (1999-2008)
One of the most contentious issues in the first decade of ADA case law was
whether courts should consider an individual's use of mitigating measures when
determining the existence of an impairment that substantially limits a major life
42 Id. at 287.
4 See Heywood, supra note 12, at 616.
4 Pazer, 849 F. Supp. at 287.
45 Price v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).
4 Id. at 422.
47 Id. at 423-24.
48 Id. at 436 (Pazer, 849 F. Supp. 287).
49 Id. at 426 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.309 (1996)).
SO Id. at 427.
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activity. 5  Mitigating measures are corrective actions that ameliorate the effects of
an impairment without actually eliminating the impairment itself. In June 1999, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of mitigating measures and decided a series of
cases that significantly narrowed ADA protections. With its decisions in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc.,52 Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,ss and Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court held that ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures were to be considered in determining whether an individual was
substantially limited in a major life activity.5 5 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. has
become the most commonly cited case for this point. In turn, it has also become the
primary focus of legislative reform in the area of disability rights.ss
Sutton involved twin sisters, both of whom had severe visual problems without
corrective lenses, and could see at a level no better than 20/200. However, with
corrective lenses, they were able to function identically to individuals without a
similar impairment.5 7  When the sisters applied for employment as commercial
airline pilots, they were denied the positions because they did not meet the airline's
minimum vision requirement of 20/100 or better. When the sisters filed a charge
of disability discrimination under the ADA in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, the court held that they were not substantially limited in any
major life activity, and thus had not stated a claim that they were disabled within the
meaning of the ADA.59 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment,
and the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari.o
In affirming the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court concluded that although the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and DOJ guidelines
directed that a disability determination be made without reference to mitigating
measures, such an interpretation would be impermissible under the ADA. 6' The
Court first asserted that the EEOC and DOJ regulations could not be given
s1 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
mitigating measures should be referenced when determining the existence of a disability).
Contra Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
disabilities should be determined without reference to mitigating measures); Matczak v.
Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding the same);
Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859-66 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding the
same).
52 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. (Sutton II), 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
s3 Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
54 Murphy v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
5 See, e.g., Sutton II, 527 U.S. at 475.
56 See, e.g., ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 (2008).
" Sutton II, 527 U.S. at 475.
58 Id. at 476.
60 Id. at 477.
61 Id. at 481-82 (addressing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2() (1998); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35,
App. A, § 35.104 (1998); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B, § 36.104 (1998)).
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substantial deference because neither the EEOC nor the DOJ had been given
authority to issue regulations implementing the "generally applicable" provisions of
the ADA, which governed the definition of "disability." 62
The Court then pointed to three provisions of the ADA that, when read in
concert, contradicted the approach adopted by the EEOC and the DOJ. First, the
Court reasoned that because the phrase "substantially limits" appears in the Act in
the present indicative verb form, the language is properly read as requiring a person
to be presently limited, not hypothetically limited.M Second, since a disability
determination is an "individualized inquiry," the agency approach was inappropriate
because it required the courts to make a disability determination based on general
information about how an uncorrected impairment "usually" affects individuals
rather than on the individual's actual condition.6 5 Finally, the Court found Congress'
declaration that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities" to be indicative of the fact that Congress did not intend to protect all
individuals whose unmitigated conditions amounted to disabilities. In order to
draw such an inference, the Court pointed out that "the number of people with vision
impairments alone is 100 million."67 Therefore, the Court held that Congress could
not have intended to include all persons with corrected impairments, or else it would
have cited a much higher number of disabled persons in its findings.
Lower courts applied the Supreme Court's holding in Sutton to many actions
under the ADA, including those involving requests for accommodations on licensing
exams due to alleged learning disabilities. One of the first and most prominent post-
Sutton cases involving learning disabilities was Gonzales v. National Board of
Medical Examiners.6 9  Gonzales involved a medical student who was seeking
extended time on Step 1 of the United States Medical Licensing Exam because of an
alleged learning disability. 70 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized Pazer's
conclusion that there is "some merit to the argument that a disparity between
inherent capacity and performance on a test may, in some circumstances, permit the
inference that an individual's performance has met the standard of an ordinary
person." 71 However, the Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court's holding
that the plaintiff did not exhibit any kind of disparity that could be said to be a
62 Id. at 479.
63 Id. at 482.
6 Id. at 482 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1998)).
65 Id. at 483 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) ("The term disability means, with respect to an
individual .. . a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual.") (emphasis added)).
66 Id. at 484 (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1998)).
67 Id. at 487 (referencing NAT'L ADVISORY EYE COUNCIL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERvS., VISION RESEARCH-A NATIONAL PLAN: 1999-2003, 7 (1998)).
6' Id. at 487.
69 225 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2000).
70 Id. at 622.
71 Id. at 629 (quoting Pazer v. New York State Board of Law Exam'rs, 849 F. Supp. 284,
287 (1994)).
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disability.72 In reaching that conclusion, the Sixth Circuit cited Gonzales' history of
academic success.73 The court further cited the Supreme Court's holding in Sutton,
and concluded that even if Gonzales' academic successes were due to self-
accommodations, he could not be considered disabled under the ADA.74
In addition to its application of Sutton, the Sixth Circuit made a ruling in regard
to Gonzales' claim of being substantially limited in the major life activity of working
that would prove to be controversial. Gonzales claimed that he was substantially
limited in the major life activity of working, and that he was restricted in his ability
to perform a class of jobs due to his difficulties in passing the licensing exam.
Gonzales advocated for the court to apply the EEOC's Title I definition of
"substantially limits" as it related to the major life activity of working, which stated,
"the term substantially limits means significantly restricted .. . as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities."7 5 This definition
differed from the definition of "substantially limits" provided by the EEOC and the
DOJ for every other relevant major life activity, which required an individual to be
"restricted in comparison to the average person in the population, or to most
people."76 The DOJ regulations pertaining to Titles II and III of the ADA were, and
continue to be, silent as to whether the major life activity of working deserves a
different standard than the other major life activities.
The Sixth Circuit declined to transplant the EEOC's definition of "substantially
limits" in regard to the major life activity of working for a claim governed by Title
III of the ADA. The Sixth Circuit gave three primary reasons for its decision. First,
the court presumed that if the DOJ wanted to modify its definition of "substantially
limits" regarding the major life activity of working, then it would have expressly
done so, just as the EEOC had done with Title I.77 Second, the court noted that the
plaintiffs claimed disability in the major life activity of working was itself
problematic because the Supreme Court had recently questioned whether working
could even be a major life activity under the ADA. Finally, the Sixth Circuit found
that the ADA's legislative history lent no support to Gonzales' argument, and that
such history suggested that Congress intended "substantially limits" to be interpreted
72 Id. at 629.
71 Id. at 630.
74 Id. at 630 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. (Sutton II), 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)).
7s Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630(j)(3)(i) (1999)).
76 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2()(1)(ii) (emphasis added); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B (1999)
(emphasis added).
n Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 631.
78 Id. at 631 (citing Sutton II, 527 U.S. at 492) ("We note ... that there may be some
conceptual difficulty in defining 'major life activities' to include work, for it seems 'to argue
in a circle to say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment, from
working with others] . . . then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question
you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of handicap."') (quoting Transcript
of Oral Argument at 15, School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 475 U.S. 1118 (1986) (No.
85-1277) (argument of Solicitor General)).
300 [Vol. 59:291
HeinOnline  -- 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 300 2011
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
LEARNING DISABILITIES AND THE ADA
as "significantly restricted in a major life activity in relation to the average person
within the population," no matter what major life activity was being considered.7 9
Another case dealing with accommodations on licensing exams under the ADA
decided post-Sutton was Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners.so
Bartlett is probably the most prominent case in this area due to its procedural
journey from the Southern District of New York to the United States Supreme Court,
and its subsequent remand back through the circuit to the district court. ' Marilyn J.
Bartlett had a history of academic success. She had successfully attained a Ph.D.
from New York University in 1981 and a law degree from Vermont Law School in
1991. Bartlett first received accommodations for her learning disability while
studying at New York University. Although she did not receive accommodations on
her Law School Admissions Test, she did receive accommodations while at Vermont
Law School.82 Bartlett attempted to pass the New York State Bar Examination in
July 1991, February 1992, and February 1993. She failed all three attempts. Bartlett
was not granted accommodations for these attempts. Pursuant to a stipulation
ordered by the district court, Bartlett was granted accommodations on her fourth
attempt to pass the bar exam. Despite the accommodations, she failed the bar exam
once again. Still, Bartlett claimed that the accommodations were inadequate, and the
litigation continued.
After both the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals decided in favor of Bartlett, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and remanded the case to the Second Circuit so that it could be decided in
light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sutton.8 On remand, the Second
Circuit affirmed that "reading" and "working" were major life activities. The court
then addressed the question of whether Bartlett's impairment "substantially limited"
her with respect to the major life activities of "reading" and "working" in light of the
86Supreme Court's decision in Sutton. In evaluating the reading claim, the Second
Circuit recognized that Bartlett's self-accommodations accounted for her academic
" Id. at 631-32 (citing S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)).
80 226 F.3d 69 (2nd Cir. 2000) (remanded to the Southern District of New York, No. 93
CIV. 4986 (SS), 2001 WL 930792 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
8 970 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Bartlett 1); 2 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y.) (motion
for reconsideration denied) (Bartlett II); 156 F.3d 321 (2nd Cir. 1998) (Bartlett 11l); 527 U.S.
1031 (1999) (Bartlett IV); 226 F.3d 69 (2nd Cir. 2000) (Bartlett V); 2001 WL 930792
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Bartlett VI).
82 970 F. Supp. at 1101 ("The law school accommodations included time-and-a-half to
take examinations, the use of a yellow legal pad with a red left margin instead of the
traditional 'blue book,' and permission to circle the answers on multiple choice examinations
instead of filling in a computer-scored answer sheet.").
8 Id. at 1102-04.
* Bartlett IV, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999) ("Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., (Sutton II) 527 U.S. 471 (1999).").
8s 226 F.3d at 80 (citing Bartlett III, 156 F.3d at 328 n.3; EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181
F.3d 645, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1999)).
8 Id. at 80-85.
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success.87 The court also affirmed the trial court's original finding that Bartlett
"reads slowly, haltingly, and laboriously."88  Still, the court members were not
prepared to hold that Bartlett was substantially limited in the major life activity of
reading. Instead, this issue was remanded so that the district court could make a
factual determination as to whether Bartlett's slow reading rate amounted to a
substantial limitation in comparison to most people or only a "mere difference."89
The Second Circuit also addressed the question of whether Bartlett was
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. The court held that the
trial court did not err in relying on the EEOC regulations to define "substantially
limits" with respect to "working" because such regulations were not inconsistent
with the DOJ regulations pertaining to Title III of the ADA.90 This holding was in
direct contradiction to that of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gonzales.91 In
the end, however, the court could not affirm the original district court conclusion that
Bartlett was substantially limited in the major life activity of working. According to
the Second Circuit, Bartlett failed to show that her inability to practice law resulted
from her reading impairment, rather than other factors that may have prevented her
from passing the bar exam. Therefore, this issue was also remanded so that the
district court could make a factual finding as to whether Bartlett's impairment, rather
than factors such as her education, experience, or innate ability, "substantially
limited" her ability to work.92
Following remand by the Second Circuit, Judge Sonia Sotomayor issued the
decision for the Southern District of New York. 93 Judge Sotomayor first addressed
the major life activity of reading, and how the Supreme Court's holding in Sutton
related to Bartlett's alleged substantial limitation. The court concluded that the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures should only be referenced if they affect
the individual's ability to perform the major life activity in question.94 The court
cited opinions from a number of other courts that had considered the issue post-
Sutton, and had come to similar conclusions.95 Judge Sotomayor applied this
8 Id at 80.
8 Id. at 81 (citing Bartlett 1, 970 F. Supp. at 1099).
89 Id. at 81-82 (citing Albertson's v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999)).
9 Id. at 83 (referencing the Department of Justice's amicus curiae brief; and Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (holding agency's interpretation of its own regulation to be
"controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation")).
91 See Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 631-32.
92 Bartlett V, 226 F.3d at 85.
9 Sonia Sotomayor is currently an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States. President Barack Obama nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court on
May 26, 2009, and she was confirmed by the United States Senate on August 6, 2009.
94 Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. 93 CIV. 4986 (SS), 2001 WL 930792, at
*31 (Bartlett Vi).
9 Id. at 31-34 (citing Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1039 (D.
Ariz. 1999) (finding that measures that merely helped the plaintiff to communicate, but did
not improve her ability to hear, should not be referenced in regard to whether she was
substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing); Root v. Ga. State Bd. of Veterinary
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conclusion to Bartlett's situation and found that while Bartlett used coping strategies,
like study groups and dictation, to assist her with reading, such methods "merely
help[ed] plaintiff function ... [and did] not affect her ability to read."9 6 The court
therefore found such coping measures to be irrelevant to any determination of
whether Bartlett was substantially limited in the major life activity of reading.
In addition, Judge Sotomayor held that Bartlett's real world achievements were
"not inconsistent with" the court finding her to be substantially limited in the major
life activity of reading.9 7 The court specifically held that Bartlett's success was the
result of her "creativity in finding methods around reading . . . and [is] further
evidence that she is substantially limited in reading when compared to 'most
people."' 98 In making the actual finding that Bartlett was indeed substantially
limited in comparison to most people, the court refused to base its decision purely on
psychometric tests and a percentile cut-off mark, as was recommended by the New
York State Board of Law Examiners. The court held that "such a standard must take
into consideration an applicant's evaluation report in toto, rather than focusing
exclusively on psychometric test scores."9
Although Judge Sotomayor had found Bartlett to be substantially limited in
reading, she went on to address the Second Circuit's question in regard to the major
life activity of working - whether the denial of accommodations was a substantial
factor in preventing her from passing the bar exam. 100 Because the bar examination
involves extensive reading and writing, and Bartlett had proven that her reading
impairment seriously decreased her rate of reading, the court found a sufficient
causal connection between her reading impairment and her failure to pass the bar
exam. Judge Sotomayor then confirmed that when compared to persons of
comparable training, skills, and abilities, in accordance with EEOC regulations,
Bartlett's reading skills were well below normal. 10 Thus, the court found that
Bartlett was substantially limited in the major life activity of working.' 02
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Wong v. Regents of the University
of Cahfornia, provided a more narrow interpretation of the ADA that highlighted the
disparity amongst the circuit courts in terms of finding a substantial limitation in
regard to the major life activities of learning, reading, and working.'03 Wong
involved a plaintiff medical student with a history of academic success and a limited
Med., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2000), rev'd in part, vacated in part on other
grounds 252 F.3d 443 (11th Cir. 2001)).
96 Bartlett VI, 2001 WL 930792, at *35.
9 Id. at *40; contra Price, 966 F. Supp at 427 ("[E]ach of the students has a history of
significant scholastic achievement reflecting a complete absence of any substantial limitation
on learning ability."); Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 630.
98 Bartlett VI, 2001 WL 930792, at *40.
9 Id. at *41.
'0 Id. at *44-46.
101 Id
102 id
103 410 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2005).
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history of having any learning or reading impairments.' Wong performed well
without accommodations during the first two years of medical school, but "[w]hen
his program moved to the clinical clerkships in the third year . .. [his] performance
deteriorated substantially . . . . He was diagnosed by the University Disability
Resource Center as having an impairment that limited his ability to process and
communicate information." 0 5 Wong eventually requested an eight-week reading
period before his next clerkship, and was denied. He was later dismissed from the
medical school after the school committees concluded that he was not qualified to
meet the school's academic standards.'06 Wong subsequently brought suit in the
Eastern District of California, and the court granted summary judgment to the
defendant university on the grounds that there was no genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Wong was substantially limited in the major life activities of learning,
reading, or working.'0 7
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding, and
relied on Price to conclude that Wong's academic success was fatally inconsistent
with his claim to be disabled. 0 8  In doing so, the court declared that although
Wong's academic achievement was not directly inconsistent with the contention that
he is substantially limited in "reading," as it was in regard to the major life activity
of "learning," "the relationship between reading and academic success is sufficiently
close to make that argument a difficult one to maintain." 09 The Ninth Circuit also
held that Wong had not shown that he was substantially limited in the major life
activity of working because it had not been shown that his failure to pass the
clerkships would foreclose him from a broad range of jobs. In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Wong "will only be precluded from
jobs that require very specific and detailed deductive reasoning . . . ."o10 Wong's
holding contradicted many of the legal conclusions reached in Bartlett. These
disagreements fueled the flames of the already burning fire in the movement for
Congress to restore broad protections under the ADA.
IV. THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008
President George W. Bush signed the ADAAA into law on September 25, 2008.
The Act's purpose was clear - "to carry out the ADA's objectives of providing 'a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination' . . .
by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA.""M The
'0 "In kindergarten, Wong was identified as suffering from a learning impairment, but in
grammar school he was certified as a gifted student .... In high school and college, he
regularly requested extra time on assignments and essay examinations." Wong v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d, 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005).
'0 Id. at 1057.
106 Id. at 1057-58.
107 Id. at 1059.
108 Id. at 1059 (citing Price, 966 F. Supp. 419).
' Id. at 1067; contra Bartlett VI, 2001 WL 930792 at *37-40.
no Id. at 1059, 1067.
1n ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(b)(1) (2008).
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amendment had been a long time coming. After much discussion about the ADA's
narrowing scope of protection, the National Council on Disability issued a report
entitled "Righting the ADA" in 2002.112 The report paved the way for a number of
policy briefs that discussed, among other things, the Supreme Court's
misinterpretation of ADA findings and the Court's conclusion that a disability
determination should reference the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures."' In
February 2008, a coalition of advocates from the disability and business
communities came together to compromise on an appropriate amendment for the
ADA.114 The negotiating group reached a final agreement in May 2008, and this
agreement formed the basis for a corresponding Congressional agreement - the
ADAAA. The ADAAA passed both branches with strong support, and was signed
into law before the end of the year." 5
The ADAAA explicitly rejected the holdings of two Supreme Court cases -
Sutton v. United Air Lines"'6 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams."7  Toyota was rejected for its strict interpretation of the phrase
"substantially limits.""'8 Sutton was rejected for a number of reasons, including its
holding that a disability is to be determined with reference to the ameliorative effects
of mitigating measures." 9 Also, due to the Supreme Court's reasoning for denying
coverage in Sutton, Congress removed from its findings the statement that "some
112 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, Policy Brief Series: Righting the ADA (2002),
available at www.ncd.gov/publications/2002 and www.ncd.gov/publications/2003.
113 Id., Brief No. 6, Defining "Disability" in a Civil Rights Context: The Court's Focus on
Extent of Limitations as Opposed to Fair Treatment and Equal Opportunity, text at n. 29,
available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2003/Feb242003.
114 MEMORANDUM FROM JEFFREY C. MCGUINESS, HR Policy-Supported "ADA
Amendments Act" Offers Balanced Approach to Revising the ADA, n.85 (September 25, 2008)
(available at www.hrpolicy.org). (Disability community representatives included American
Association of People with Disabilities; Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law; Epilepsy
Foundation; National Council on Independent Living; and National Disability Rights
Network. Business representatives included the HR Policy Association; National Association
of Manufacturers; Society for Human Resource Management; and United States Chamber of
Commerce.).
" The House of Representatives passed an initial version of the bill with a vote of 402
Ayes, 17 Nays, and 15 Present/Not Voting. See
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 10-3195. The Senate passed its bill with
unanimous consent, and the House approved on a voice vote. See
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 110-3406.
116 Sutton v. United Air Lines (Sutton II), 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
117 Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). The ADAAA
rejected the holding of this case because it interpreted the term "substantially limits" to require
a greater degree of limitation than was intended by Congress. See ADA Amendments Act of
2008, Public Law 110-325 (2008), § 2(a)(7).
118 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(b)(4) (2008); § 2(b)(5)
(2008).
" See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(b)(2) (2008).
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43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities."1 20
Congress also produced a non-exhaustive list of major life activities that explicitly
included "learning," "reading," and "working."' ' Interestingly, other than
confirming the existence of such major life activities, the actual language of the
ADAAA does not speak to the specific controversies surrounding learning
disabilities and corresponding case law. Fortunately, the ADAAA has plenty of
legislative history that speaks to the plight of individuals with learning disabilities. 122
The House Committee on Education and Labor for the 110 Congress issued a
Report of the Committee's views on June 23, 2008 in anticipation of the bill's
enactment. In its discussion on how to interpret "substantially limits" under the
ADAAA, the Committee weighed in on the term's significance in regard to specific
learning disabilities. The Committee stated,
When considering the condition, manner or duration in which an
individual with a specific learning disability performs a major life
activity, it is critical to reject the assumption that an individual who
performs well academically or otherwise cannot be substantially limited
in activities such as learning, reading, writing, thinking, or speaking. As
such, the Committee rejects the findings in Price v. National Board of
Medical Examiners, Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners,
and Wong v. Regents of University of California.123
Further, in addressing the issue of mitigating measures and the rejection of
Sutton, the Committee explicitly endorsed the holding of Bartlett v. New York State
Board of Law Examiners, in which the court held that a determination of whether a
plaintiff is substantially limited should not take into consideration the plaintiffs
ability to self-accommodate.1 24 In support of such endorsement, the Committee
expressed its belief that someone should not be penalized simply because they have
"managed their own adaptive strategies or received informal or undocumented
accommodations that have the effect of lessening the deleterious impacts of their
disability."'25 In essence, the Committee endorsed Bartlett in many of the ways that
it differed from Price, Gonzales, and Wong. What is yet to be seen is the extent to
which the courts will incorporate and acknowledge the ADAAA's legislative history
with respect to the rights of individuals with learning disabilities.
120 Compare ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Public Law 110-325 § 2 (2008) with 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990) (amended 2008).
121 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 4(a) (2008) ("[M]ajor life
activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communication, and working.").
122 See H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1 (2008).
123 Id. at 11.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The courts can bring case law in step with the intentions of Congress and also
clarify standards for examination boards by addressing future claims in a slightly
different manner than in the past. This Article makes three primary
recommendations for future decisions regarding licensing exam accommodations for
learning disabilities: (1) the courts should no longer foreclose the finding of a
substantially limiting impairment in regard to the major life activity of reading due
to an individual's academic success; (2) "working" should be recognized as an
appropriate major life activity under which to evaluate claims for accommodations
on the bar exam (and possibly other licensing exams), with such evaluations
involving a comparison to people having comparable training, skills, and abilities;
and (3) reading disabilities should be recognized not only by psychometric tests that
show a substantial limitation in comparison to most people, but also by test scores
that indicate a significant discrepancy between an individual's intellectual capacity
and actual reading ability. By following these recommendations, the courts will be
able to evaluate future claims for accommodations on licensing exams with
standards that reflect Congress' intention to provide a broad scope of protection
under the ADA.
A. Academic Success
There are a number of reasons why academic success should not foreclose the
courts from finding an individual's reading impairment to be substantially limiting.
First, due to Judge Sotomayor's treatment of the issue in Bartlett VI, there exists
strong persuasive precedent for not allowing academic success to derail an
individual's claim.126 Second, the legislative history of the ADAAA clearly rejects
the holdings of Price, Gonzales, and Wong, in which courts held that academic
success foreclosed the plaintiffs disability claim.127 The House Committee on
Education and Labor specifically stated that "it is critical to reject the assumption
that an individual who performs well academically or otherwise cannot be
substantially limited."' Referencing legislative history in this manner is
appropriate. The language of the ADAAA does not specifically refer to the issue,
and the views of the Committee do not in any way contradict of the Act's language.
In fact, the Committee's views fit perfectly with the ADAAA's purose of
"reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA."12  Third,
the EEOC, in its most recent promulgation of regulations governing Title I of the
ADA, specifically states that "someone with a learning disability may achieve a high
level of academic success, but may nevertheless be substantially limited in the major
life activity of learning because of the additional time or effort he or she must spend
to read, write, or learn compared to most people in the general population."' 3 0
126 Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. 93 CIV. 4986 (SS), 2001 WL
930792 at 37-40 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2001).
127 H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 11 (2008).
128 id.
129 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(2008).
130 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(iii) (2011).
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In addition, common sense tells us that academic success should not foreclose an
individual from being disabled due to a reading impairment. To hold otherwise
would be to penalize individuals who use hard work and creativity to find ways
around their impairments in order to achieve success. This point is especially
relevant in regard to accommodations on licensing exams. Students who sit for
licensing exams almost always have a history of academic success. If they did not,
they would not be in a position to sit for the licensing exam in the first place.
Therefore, if academic success always forecloses a court from finding a substantially
limiting reading impairment, then no impaired individual would ever be eligible for
licensing exam accommodations. By referencing the Act's legislative history, the
EEOC's implementing regulations, and pure common sense, the courts will be able
to effectively recognize the ADAAA's purpose of restoring broad protections under
the ADA.
B. The Major Life Activity of Working
The ADAAA should be used as a basis for clarifying various contradictory
rulings in regard to the major life activity of working. In Gonzales, the Sixth Circuit
questioned whether working was even a major life activity. In doing so, the Sixth
Circuit cited language from Sutton, in which the Court referenced the EEOC's
suggestion that "working be viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a last
resort, only if an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any other
major life activity." It is true that working is to be considered only when an
individual is not substantially limited with respect to another major life activity.133
However, Congress dispelled the Supreme Court's concerns that working was not
meant to be a major life activity by explicitly listing "working" as a major life
activity within the language of the ADAAA.1 34
When working has been considered as a legitimate major life activity, there have
been diverging conclusions on what regulations should be used to determine whether
an individual has a substantially limiting impairment under Titles II and III."' As
noted earlier, individuals requesting accommodations under the ADAAA for state
licensing exams must do so under Title II (public services) and Title III (public
accommodations and services provided by private entities). Unlike the EEOC
regulations and interpretative guidance pertaining to Title I (employment), the DOJ
regulations pertaining to Titles II and III do not explicitly define what it means to be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Therefore, some courts
have held that a disability determination under Titles II and III cannot involve a
131 Gonzales v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 225 F.3d 620 at 631 (6th Cir. 2000).
132 Id. (citing Sutton II, 527 U.S. at 492).
33 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 App. (2011).
134 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553
(2008).
13 See Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 2 F. Supp. 2d 388, 389-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[T]he EEOC's interpretation of substantial limitation in the context of the
major life activity of working is both a part of, and consistent with, the Department of
Justice's regulations and the purpose of the ADA."). Contra Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 631 ("We
decline to transplant this definition from the Title I regulations into the Title III regulations.").
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comparison to a person "having comparable training, skills, and abilities,"ise as
stated by the EEOC, but instead that such a determination must be made in
comparison to "most people" in the general population.' 3 7 In the future, the DOJ
may also define a different comparison group in regard to the major life activity of
working, but until that time comes, the courts should be willing to use the EEOC
standard to evaluate claims involving the major life activity of working under Titles
II and III.
In its original section by section analysis of the regulations pertaining to Title II,
the DOJ specifically stated: "Title II . . . incorporates those provisions of Title I and
III of the ADA that are not inconsistent with the regulations implementing Section
504 [of the Rehabilitation Act]. Therefore, this part also includes appropriate
provisions derived from the regulations implementing those titles."' 3 8 From this, it
is evident that the DOJ anticipated regulations from different titles being used in
order to lend meaning to concepts absent from its own regulations.139 The courts
have never seriously questioned the consistency of the EEOC regulations in regard
to the major life activity of working and the regulations implementing Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. The EEOC and the DOJ promulgated the regulations
pertaining to the ADA in a cooperative spirit so that the regulations would not be
inconsistent with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In fact, Section 107(b) of
the ADA mandated consistency.140
As further proof that the Title I regulations do not apply lesser standards than
those of the Rehabilitation Act, the Rehabilitation Act now specifically points to the
standards established by Title I of the ADA and its regulations.141 Section 793(d) of
the Rehabilitation Act provides that "[t]he standards used to determine whether this
section has been violated . . . shall be the standards applied under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act."l 42 In the end, the EEOC's regulations pertaining
to Title I of the ADA are entirely consistent with the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of
the ADA, and the remedial character of the ADA as a whole. Thus, courts
evaluating claims under Titles II and III should decide whether an individual is
136 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (2011) (describing the standard for being substantially
limited in the major life activity of working).
In See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104, App. A (2011).
13' 28 C.F.R. § 35.103, App. A (2011) (The original section by section analysis remains
relevant to the extent it is not contradicted by the amendments to the rules or it provides
guidance on provisions of the rules unchanged by the revised 2010 ADA regulations).
39 See Bartlett, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 391.
140 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2006) ("The agencies with
enforcement authority for actions which allege employment discrimination under this title and
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 shall develop procedures to ensure that administrative
complaints filed under this title and under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are dealt with in a
manner that avoids duplication of effort and prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting
standards for the same requirements under this title and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.").
'' See Bartlett, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
142 29 U.S.C. § 793(d) (2006).
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substantially limited in the major life activity of working by comparing that
individual to "most people having comparable training, skills, and abilities."l43
In addition to a comparison to "most people having comparable training, skills,
and abilities," the EEOC definition of "substantially limits" for the major life
activity of working provides that a plaintiff must show that the impairment
substantially limits his or her "ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes." 1" Specifically, in regard to state bar exams (and possibly
other licensing exams), the courts would be wise to recognize that if an individual
attempting to pass the bar exam is substantially limited in comparison to most people
having comparable training, skills, and abilities, then that individual's disability has
implicated the major life activity of working. The major point here is that an
individual's attempt to pass the bar exam implicates an ability or inability "to
perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes." 4 5 Numerous
courts have held that the proper scope of inquiry in determining whether a disability
implicates an ability or inability to perform a class of jobs is the relevant
employment at issue, and not employment generally. 146 Therefore, for a law school
graduate attempting to pass the bar exam, the appropriate legal inquiry would focus
on jobs in the legal profession, rather than every job in the national economy.
In addition, in a previous version of the EEOC's Interpretative Guidance, it is
written that "an individual is not substantially limited in working just because he or
she is unable to perform a particular job for one employer, or because he or she is
unable to perform a specialized job or profession requiring extraordinary skill,
prowess, and talent."l 47 In order to give an example of such a specialized profession,
the EEOC pointed to the pursuits of a professional athlete.14 The question then
becomes whether practicing law is specialized in the same way as professional
athletics. Reason tells us that it is not. If it were, then every profession would have
to be classified as a specialized profession, because each profession contains its own
"extraordinary skill, prowess, and talent."l 49 As such, many disabled Americans
could be excluded from professions such as medicine and accounting. Thus, it is
apparent that this provision is not meant for individuals whose impairments prevent
them from entering such professions. Instead, this provision is meant to address
individuals whose impairment prevents them from obtaining a highly specialized
job, such as that of a professional athlete.150 Therefore, because failure to pass the
143 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (2011).
144 Id.
145 id.
146 Bartlett v. New York State Bd. Of Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094 (Bartlett 1) (citing
Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17,
25 (1st Cir. 1993); Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992); Taylor v.
United States Parcel Serv., 946 F.2d 1214, 1217 (6th Cir. 1991); and Forrisi v. Bowen, 794
F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986)).
147 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) App. (1992).
I48 Id.
149 See Bartlett I, 970 F.Supp. at 1123.
Iso Id. at 1123-24.
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bar exam effectively excludes an individual from performing "a class of jobs,"'5 1 an
individual whose impairment substantially limits him or her from passing the bar
exam in comparison to "most people having comparable training, skills, and
abilities"'52 is substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
C Finding a Substantial Limitation in the Major Life Activity of Reading
In determining what methods are appropriate to evaluate an individual's potential
reading disability, many interests need to be considered, including those of
Congress, licensing examiners, reading impaired individuals, and the public at large.
Standards that reflect the ADA's "broad scope of protection" are appropriate in order
to accommodate the interests of Congress, along with many reading impaired
individuals.'53  Therefore, in addition to recognizing a disability when an
individual's psychometric test scores show a substantial limitation in comparison to
"most people,"l 54 a disability should be recognized when test scores indicate a
significant discrepancy between an individual's intellectual capacity and actual
reading ability.'55 Further, clear and precise standards are appropriate in order to
accommodate the interests of licensing examiners. Bright-line cut-offs should exist
for both of the aforementioned ways to determine a substantially limiting reading
impairment. With such bright-line cut-offs, the licensing examiners and the courts
will be less likely to make inconsistent judgments about whether an individual is
deserving of accommodations.
Section 36.309 of the DOJ regulations pertaining to Title III requires
examinations to be administered so that the results "accurately reflect the
individual's aptitude or achievement level ... rather than reflecting the individual's
impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills."' 56 This provision provided the basis
for Pazer's conclusion that a discrepancy between inherent capacity and
performance permits the inference of a substantially limiting impairment, even if the
individual's actual performance has met the standard of the ordinary person.' 7 This
acknowledgment of the "discrepancy theory" was later rebuffed in Price when the
court concluded that Section 36.309 of the DOJ regulations did not outweigh the
principle that an impairment must limit a person in comparison to "most people" in
order to be considered a disability worthy of accommodations. 58
Congress' desire to provide increased protection under the ADA should give the
courts reason to reject Price. A reading impaired individual with a very high
"' 29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (2011).
152 id.
153 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553.
'" 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 App. B. (2011) (defining a substantial limitation of a major life
activity).
s See 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(1)(i) (2011).
56 Id.
' See Pazer v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 849 F. Supp. 284, 287 (citing 28
C.F.R. § 36.309 (1992)).
1ss See Price v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 F. Supp. 419, 426 (citing 28 C.F.R. §
36.309; 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B (1996)).
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aptitude, whose reading impairment is not necessarily substantially limiting in
comparison to most people, should not be denied accommodations if there is a
significant discrepancy between the individual's aptitude and actual reading ability.
To hold otherwise would be contrary to Section 36.309's requirement that
examinations be administered so that the results accurately reflect the individual's
aptitude. Such a holding would also be contrary to the new EEOC Title I
regulations, which state that a disability can be shown "where an impairment, such
as a learning disability, is clinically diagnosed based in part on a disparity between
an individual's aptitude and that individual's actual versus expected
achievement." 59 Law schools have granted reasonable accommodations in the past
when such discrepancies have been shown. For instance, the University of
California Hastings College of Law and the University of Houston Law Center have
previously looked to whether a student's cognitive test score is 1.5 standard
deviations1 60 or more below the level corresponding to the student's IQ in deciding
whether accommodations are warranted.' 6 1
While this Article does not speculate as to whether the 1.5 standard deviation
cut-off reflects the ADA's "broad scope of protection,"l62 it is clear that the DOJ
regulations require accommodations to be granted on licensing exams when a
significant discrepancy exists between the scores of such cognitive and IQ tests. In
choosing an adequate cut-off, the courts must ensure that they do not require a level
of discrepancy that indirectly prevents all individuals whose impairments are not
substantially limiting in comparison to most people from receiving accommodations.
Otherwise, the point of testing for discrepancies would become moot.
The courts would be wise to give the cut-off point a bright-line effect so that
licensing examiners can objectively grant and deny accommodations with certainty.
A bright-line cut-off point for psychometric reading tests is also appropriate when
determining whether an individual is impaired in comparison to "most people." 6 3
Dr. Frank R. Vellutino, who assisted the New York State Board of Law Examiners
in screening applicants who requested special accommodations on the basis of
claims that they suffered from dyslexia or reading disability, suggests a cut-off at the
30h percentile in terms of psychometric test results.i64 Dr. Vellutino reasons that
because conservative estimates of the incidence of reading disabilities is
approximately 20 percent, a cut-off at the 30f11 percentile would be justifiable. 6 5
This reasoning was rejected by Judge Sotomayor in Bartlett I on the basis of
i59 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v) App. (2011).
160 A standard deviation is a parameter that indicates the way in which a probability
function or a probability density function is centered around its mean and that is equal to the
square root of the moment in which the deviation from the mean is squared. Standard
Deviation Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/standard%20deviation (last visited September 12, 2011).
161 Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs (Bartlett VI), No. 93 CIV. 4986 (SS),
2001 WL 930792 at 43.
162 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553.
163 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 App. B. (2011).
' Vellutino, supra note 13, at 10.
165 id.
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alternative evidence suggesting that many adult dyslexics were capable of scoring
above the 30t percentile.' 66
This Article does not necessarily recommend Dr. Vellutino's specific cut-off, but
it would not be unreasonable to suggest that a cut-off at the 30 " percentile is
appropriate for licensing exam situations, even under ADA's "broad scope of
protection."' 67 This can be said because the ADA, when interpreted according to the
intentions of Congress, does not foreclose an individual from being granted
accommodations on a licensing exam merely because the individual is not
substantially limited in comparison to "most people."l 68 If an individual satisfies the
requirements of the discrepancy theory, then he or she would also be eligible for
accommodations. In addition, licensing exams, such as the bar exam, invoke the
major life activity of working, which requires an individual to be substantially
limited in comparison to "most people having comparable training, skills, and
abilities."' 69 If the 30'" percentile is used as a bright-line cut-off for determining
whether an individual is substantially limited in comparison to "most people," then
surely a significantly higher cut-off would be required for determining whether a
reading impaired professional school graduate is substantially limited in comparison
to "most people having comparable training, skills, and abilities."7 o Thus, it would
be unlikely that an individual with dyslexia could legitimately be denied reasonable
accommodations on a licensing exam.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ADA was the first piece of federal civil rights legislation to pertain to state
licensing exams. As such, individuals who had "learning disabilities" that
substantially limited a major life activity were entitled to reasonable
accommodations on licensing exams under the ADA. Due to the courts'
increasingly narrow interpretation of the ADA, Congress passed the ADAAA in
2008. One of the primary purposes of the ADAAA was to restore a "broad scope of
protection" under the ADA.17 1 In order to adhere to the intentions of Congress, the
courts must address claims for accommodations on licensing exams differently than
they have in the past. This includes granting accommodations to substantially
limited individuals even if they have a history of academic success, recognizing the
appropriateness of the major life activity of working, and recognizing the
discrepancy theory for evaluating a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
reading. By following these recommendations, the courts will be able to evaluate
future claims for accommodations on licensing exams with standards that reflect
Congress' intention to provide a "broad scope of protection" under the ADA.172
'" Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs (Bartlett 1), 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1114
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
167 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(b)(1) (2008).
16' 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 App. B.
169 29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (2011).
170 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 App. B (2011); 29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (2011).
' See Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(b)(1).
172 id.
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